We use a sample of full-time workers over 50 years of age from the 2004 and 2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to investigate whether workers in federal, state, and local government receive more generous wage and pension compensation than private sector workers, ceteris paribus. With respect to hourly remuneration (wages plus employer contributions to defined contribution plans), federal workers earn a premium of about 28 log points, taking differences in employee characteristics into account. However, there are no statistically discernible differences between state and local workers and their private sector counterparts, ceteris paribus. These findings are about the same whether or not indicators of occupation are included in the model. On the other hand, pension wealth accumulation is greater for employees in all three government sectors than for private sector workers, even after taking worker characteristics into account. As a proportion of the hourly private-sector wage, the hourly equivalent public-private differentials are about 17.2 percent, 13.4 percent, and 12.6 percent for federal, state, and local workers, respectively. We find no evidence that highly-educated individuals are penalized by taking jobs in the public sector, either with respect to wages or pension wealth.
Introduction
For many years, both academics and public policy makers have debated whether public sector workers are overor under-paid relative to their private sector counterparts. This issue has recently received particular attention because of the severe budgetary constraints facing governments at all levels. For example, former Governor Mitch Daniels of Indiana argued, "We have a new privileged class in America…We used to think of government workers as underpaid public servants. Now they are better paid than the people who pay their salaries…Who serves whom here? Is the public sector-as some of us have always thought-there to serve the rest of society? Or is it the other way around?" (Garofalo, 2010) . At the same time, some public employees maintain that they are underpaid. A seventh-grade English teacher demonstrating against Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker's plan to reduce public sector benefits told the Huffington Post, "I can't get a home loan. I set my thermostat at 62. No cable at my house, no internet…I'm also $36,000 in debt from becoming a teacher" (Delaney, 2011) .
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie (2010) captured the essence of the issue nicely when he said, "at some point, there has to be parity between what is happening in the real world and what is happening in the public-sector world." But determining what "parity" means in this context is challenging for two reasons. First, the human capital of public and private sector workers may differ. If, for example, public sector workers have more education than private sector workers, then it is neither surprising nor objectionable that they earn higher wages. This is precisely the argument made by former White House budget director Peter Orszag regarding federal government compensation: "Basically the entire delta between private sector and public sector federal government average pay can be explained by education and experience…while there may be some remaining disparities, I think some of the more dramatic newspaper stories I've seen about that disparity are somewhat misleading" (Tuutti, 2010) . The second reason why public-private sector comparisons are problematic is that compensation consists of more than just wages and salaries. Pension benefits comprise an important part of compensation, so that comparisons of just wages and salaries may be misleading. Indeed, sectoral differences in pension benefits have recently drawn considerable attention. According to Cook (2011) , "union chiefs can downplay their pension benefits all they want. The fact is, most of their members have been guaranteed a millionaire's retirement." Public-sector unions argue that such criticism is hyperbolic and unjustified. In the words of Hetty Rosenstein, New Jersey Director of the Communications Workers of America, "there's pension envy because people who are working in the private sector, they're being denied pensions" (Mulvihill, 2011) .
In any case, it is clear that a sensible approach to measuring an overall compensation differential requires considering both wages and pension benefits. Further, the analysis of pension differentials needs to take into account that, because pensions are a form of compensation, their magnitude is determined in part by employee characteristics, just as is the case for wages and salaries. Simply examining average pension benefits across sectors is not an appropriate way to estimate sectoral differentials.
A great deal of research on public-private sector wage differentials has been done, including careful analysis of micro-level data on individual employees that takes into account differences in workers' characteristics. In contrast, there has been little work using micro-level data on differences in pension wealth across sectors. Furthermore, the few attempts to integrate wages and pension benefits into more comprehensive measures of sectoral compensation differentials use different data sets from different time periods to estimate the wage and pension components of the differential. In this paper, we use a single data set and a unified econometric approach to estimate wage and pension wealth differentials between public and private sector workers. Compensation packages, of course, have other components, including employment security, paid vacation, health insurance benefits, and so on. (Note 1) Our analysis focuses on wages and pension benefits because they are of major importance and micro data are relatively accessible.
Section 2 surveys the existing research on public-private sector compensation differentials. Section 3 discusses our dataset, the Health and Retirement Study, and presents summary statistics for the key variables. Section 4 presents the econometric setup and basic results. We find that the hourly wages of federal government workers are about 28 log points more than private sector workers with similar characteristics, ceteris paribus. However, there are generally no statistically discernible differences between state and local workers and their private sector counterparts with similar characteristics. On the other hand, pension wealth accumulation is generally greater for employees in all three government sectors than for private sector workers, even after taking worker characteristics into account. As a proportion of the hourly private-sector wage, the hourly equivalent public-private differentials are 17.2 percent, 13.4 percent, and 12.6 percent for federal, state, and local workers, respectively.
Section 5 presents several alternative econometric specifications to assess the robustness of the results. We find that controlling for occupation leaves our substantive conclusions unaffected. Further, there is no evidence that highly educated workers are disadvantaged by working in the public sector. Section 6 concludes with a summary and some suggestions for future research.
Previous Literature
The relevant literature can be classified into three broad categories: public-private sector wage differentials, pension benefit differentials, and total compensation differentials, which include both wages and pension benefits. We now discuss each of these topics in turn.
Wage Differentials
The literature on wage differentials between public and private sector employees spans roughly four decades, originating with Smith's (1976a Smith's ( , 1976b Smith's ( , 1977 seminal papers. The core of her analysis is the estimation of conventional human capital earnings functions. For example, in Smith (1976b) she uses 1973 CPS data to estimate for each gender a regression of the logarithm of the wage on various worker characteristics such as years of schooling and race, including a series of dichotomous variables indicating whether each individual worked in the federal, state, or local government sectors (the private sector is the omitted category). For males, she finds wage differentials relative to the private sector of 19 percent in federal government and -4.9 percent in local government. The coefficient on the state government variable is statistically insignificant. The differentials for female workers are 31 percent in federal government, 12 percent in state government, and 3.6 percent in local government.
Papers subsequent to Smith's have modified her approach by trying to correct for self-selection of workers into various sectors, (Note 2) by using panel data to estimate fixed effects models, (Note 3) and by estimating models on a state-by-state basis. (Note 4) A fair way to summarize the findings in this literature is as follows: a robust result, found in almost all the research from Smith's early papers on, is that there is a substantial positive wage differential for federal employees, even after controlling for worker characteristics in the standard way. (Note 5) Quinn does not control for differences in worker characteristics such as schooling, gender, and race. In addition, his computation of pension wealth excludes DC plans. While such a decision was sensible at the time Quinn was writing, this is no longer the case, as DC plans have become an important component of pension wealth, particularly in the private sector. According to Munnell and Perun (2006) , the share of private DC plan assets out of all private pension plan assets increased from 22 percent in 1980 to 50 percent in 2004, and the corresponding share of active participants increased from 35 percent to 70 percent over the same period. Our analysis takes advantage of a more suitable estimate of pension wealth that encompasses both DB and DC plans.
Aggregating Wage and Pension Differentials
Some recent research has sought to integrate wages with fringe benefits in order to obtain a broad measure of sectoral compensation differentials. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study for 1992-2000, Ramoni-Perazzi and Bellante (2007) combine federal, state, and local employees to form a single "public" category, and use the standard approach to estimate a public-private sector wage differential that ranges from 3.5 to 11 percent. They next compute the difference in the average sectoral fringe benefit share of total compensation from Bureau of Labor Statistics data (which are not corrected for differences in the demographic composition of workers across sectors). Adding this figure to their estimated wage differential, they find a total public-private sector compensation difference that ranges from 6 to 14 percent. (Note 6) Other studies following the same general approach are Keefe (2010) , Allegretto and Keefe (2010) , Bender and Heywood (2010) , Thompson and Schmitt (2010) , Cannon (2011) and Gittleman and Pierce (2012) , all of whom study sub-federal levels of government, and the Congressional Budget Office (2012), which examines federal government compensation. To our knowledge, no analysis of public versus private sector compensation patterns has estimated both wage and pension wealth differentials using a unified multivariate econometric framework based on micro-level data. Our data allow us to do so.
Data
Our analysis sample comes from the 2006 wave of the Health and Retirement Study, a longitudinal study of Americans aged 50 and over, who are interviewed every two years by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. (Note 7) Because the HRS is primarily based on older workers, our results might not apply to employees throughout the age distribution. (Note 8) However, in addition to standard demographic data, the HRS has information on sector of employment (Note 9) as well as a rich set of variables on pension benefits, which makes it invaluable for making compensation comparisons that go beyond wage and salaries.
All variables relating to worker characteristics, hourly pay, pension plan types, and employer pension contributions are either included or directly calculated from the original 2006 Core dataset and tracker file. Data on pension wealth are obtained from a supplement constructed by Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010) . They note that there is some evidence of errors in reports of pension values, and the accuracy of the reports does not improve over time (p. 213). However, they argue that the estimates do not appear to be systematically biased. If the reporting errors differed systematically by sector of employment then this would bias our estimates of pension differentials. There is no evidence with respect to whether pension wealth estimates for public sector employees are more or less accurate than their private sector counterparts.
A total of 4,759 respondents provide salary and wage information. Respondents are also asked about the number of hours worked in a typical week and the number of weeks worked per year, allowing us to calculate total hours worked per year and hourly pay. This information is available for 4,344 respondents. We drop from the sample www.ccsenet.org/par the self-employed as well as part-time workers, defined as individuals who worked fewer than 1,500 hours per year. (Note 10) This leaves us with 3,199 observations. Furthermore, we exclude respondents who, while earning a positive hourly wage, earned less than the minimum wage or characterized themselves as retired (Note 11). Finally, we drop workers for whom information is missing for any of our right hand side variables, leaving us with 2,496 observations, which comprise our basic analysis sample. There are 1,907 respondents in the private sector, 115 in federal government, 225 in state government, and 249 in local government. Compared to the entire sample of 4,759 individuals who reported wage and salary information, this sample is slightly younger (mean age of 58.2 years versus 59.5) and has fewer black workers (9.0 percent versus 9.7 percent) and female workers (47.8 percent versus 51.4 percent). *** These are the maximal number of respondents with non-zero sample weights in each sector. However, not every question is answered by all respondents; therefore, the number of observations varies slightly across variables. Since the value of a DC plan in 2004 is a cash balance that has been accumulated based on work to date, the value of a DB plan in 2004 also needs to reflect the fraction of its total value that has accrued to it based on work to date. In order to make this adjustment, GST (2010) assume that a given worker will continue to work for his employer up to retirement and multiply the total present value of the DB plan by the number of years of service for the current employer in 2004, divided by the total (anticipated) number of years of service at the time of retirement. Adding the DC cash balances to this adjusted DB present value yields a measure of total pension wealth.
We use the 2004 value because 2004 is the most recent year that GST calculate it for all workers. (Note 15) PensionW is available for respondents in our analysis sample who were interviewed in both 2004 and 2006, and worked for the same employer in both years-2,100 of the 2,496 respondents in our analysis sample.
The variable PositivePW is one if the individual has positive pension wealth and zero otherwise. According to the figures in Table 1 , employees in all levels of government are more likely to have positive pension wealth than private sector workers, and conditional on having pension wealth, their average values are also higher. Both the probability of having positive pension wealth and the conditional mean are greatest for federal government workers.
The sectoral differences among the various compensation measures are striking. However, one must be cautious in interpreting them, given that workers' characteristics might "explain" these differences. Table 2 shows weighted means and standard deviations of the key demographic variables for workers in the private sector and various levels of government. The figures indicate that, indeed, worker characteristics differ substantially across sectors. For example, on average, government employees at all levels have more education than private sector employees, which gives some credence to the notion that the compensation differentials in Table 1 might be due to differences in human capital.
In this context, an important question is whether our analysis sample is plausibly nationally representative (conditional on the screens used to generate it). The issue is cogent because the 2006 survey does not have many of the respondents included when the HRS was started as a nationally representative data set of individuals who were 51 to 61 years of age in 1992. This is an empirical issue, and a sensible way to approach it is to apply to a nationally representative data set the same screens that we use to generate our HRS analysis sample, and compare summary statistics of the key variables that are available in both samples. 
Ex-Urban

Econometric Specification and Results
While informative, the figures in Table 1 are only suggestive because they fail to account for the fact that employee characteristics differ substantially across sectors. This section presents the results from multivariate models. (Note 16)
Hourly Wages
Basic setup. To begin, we estimate regressions of the log of hourly pay (LOG(WAGE)) on worker characteristics and dichotomous variables for sector of employment. Specifically, we regress the logarithm of the hourly wage on a set of indicators for sector of employment (with the private sector as the excluded category) as well as educational attainment, gender, race, marital status, and a quadratic in age. (Note 17, 18) In effect, this specification constrains all the coefficients, except those on the sectoral variables, to be the same across sectors. A more flexible approach, suggested by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) , allows all the coefficients to vary across sectors. We choose the more constrained model because it generates essentially the same results as the Blinder-Oaxaca approach and is simpler to exposit.
Unlike some previous studies, we do not include occupational variables in our canonical model. As Gittleman and Pierce (2012, p. 227) point out, there is no consensus on this matter. We choose not to include occupation, because occupational choice could very well be jointly determined with wages and it is available only for a subset of our sample. (Note 19) However, as shown in Section 5, when we include occupation on the right hand side, the results are nearly identical. Table 2 . Standard errors are in parentheses. A (***) indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, a (**) at the 5 percent level, and a (*) at the 10 percent level.
Results. The estimates are reported in Table 3 . The first column shows the results when only the sectoral variables are included. Substantial positive differentials are present for all government levels: federal government employees earn approximately 37.1 log points more than private sector employees, state government employees earn 16.3 log points more, and local government employees earn 8.6 log points more.
The estimates in column (2) take employee characteristics into account. The federal-private differential falls to 0.278 (s.e. = 0.045), considerably smaller than the corresponding figure in column (1), but still significantly different from zero. In contrast, the state and local government differentials are generally rendered small and statistically insignificant when worker characteristics are included in the model. Taken together, the results in columns (1) and (2) are consistent with the claim that it can be misleading to look at public-private wage differences without taking into account worker characteristics. Our finding of a large and statistically significant federal differential is generally in line with previous results, most notably by Smith (1976a Smith ( , 1976b Smith ( , 1977 , Venti (1987) , Krueger (1988) , and Moore and Raisian (1991) . However, our point estimate is somewhat larger than theirs. This raises the question of whether our finding is idiosyncratic to the HRS dataset. To investigate this possibility, we applied to the CPS the same screens as we used to generate our analysis sample, and then replicated the specification in column (2) as closely as we could. The results, in an appendix available upon request, indicate that the estimated federal differential using the CPS is somewhat smaller than our estimate in Table 3 , but one cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal. Thus, our estimate of the federal hourly earnings differential does not appear to be an artifact of the HRS sample. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the other covariates are sensible and in line with the results of previous econometric work on wage determination.
Hourly Wages and Employer Contributions to DC Plans
We now turn to differences in compensation that come in the form of pensions. (Note 20) Integrating employer contributions to defined contribution plans with wages is fairly straightforward. (We return later to issues associated with incorporating defined benefit plans.) We create a variable, WAGE+DC, which equals the sum of the (hourly) dollar amount of employer DC pension contributions (if any) (Note 21) and hourly pay. The last two columns in Table 3 (2) and (4)) are also very similar. Thus, incorporating employers' DC contributions into the analysis does not substantively change the results one obtains by looking at wages only.
Pension Wealth
So far, our focus has been on flows of compensation associated with wages and employer contributions to DC plans. In principle, one would also want to include the incremental accrued value of employer contributions to defined benefit plans during the relevant time period, which is also a flow. Such a variable is not included in the public version of the HRS data. However, Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010) calculate a useful stock measure, total pension wealth. It is defined as the sum of the present value of future benefits from a worker's most important DB plan on the current job and the cash balances in all DC plans on the current job, based on work to date.
This section examines how total pension wealth depends on sector of employment. As previously noted, just like wages, pension wealth likely depends on an employee's personal characteristics. Hence, a multivariate approach is needed to ascertain the independent effect of sector of employment upon pension wealth. We include the same set of right hand side variables as in the wage regressions. 
Pr ( Observations 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 * Columns (1) and (3) provide estimates of the marginal effects on the probability that the respondent has positive pension wealth, based on linear probability models. Columns (2) and (4) are the corresponding OLS estimates of the effects on the amount of pension wealth. The right-hand side variables are defined in Table 2 . Standard errors are in parentheses. A (***) indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, a (**) at the 5 percent level, and a (*) at the 10 percent level.
Column (1) of Table 4 shows the estimates from a linear probability model of the impact of sector of employment on the probability of having positive pension wealth without any additional covariates. Compared to private sector employees, federal workers are 21.6 percentage points more likely to have positive pension wealth, state workers are 14.8 percentage points more likely, and local workers are 12.9 percentage points more likely. All the coefficients are statistically significant. The corresponding pension wealth differentials are in column (2). Workers in all government sectors have more pension wealth than their private sector counterparts: on average, federal workers have $111,000 more pension wealth, state workers have $89,800 more, and local workers have $80,800 more.
Columns (3) and (4) include our other covariates. The most striking result is that the uncorrected pension wealth differentials from column (2) are reduced yet remain substantial and statistically significant. Specifically, column (4) shows federal, state and local pension differentials of $93,600, $62,900, and $65,800, respectively. Because wages are a flow variables and pension wealth is a stock variable, the results from Tables 3 and 4 are not directly comparable. To allow comparisons, we begin by computing the hourly annuity value of the pension wealth differential in each government sector. Suppose that the pension wealth differential in sector s is D s . Suppose further that the average number of years of service for workers in that sector is T s . Then we compute the annuity value of D s over T s years, assuming an interest rate of 5.8 percent, the rate used by Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010) 
in their calculations. (Note 22)
The mean years of service with the current employer for our 2004 pension wealth subsample (Note 23) are: 13.1 for private sector workers, 17.1 for federal workers, 14.0 for state workers, and 16.4 for local workers. Using these values and the respective pension wealth differentials from Table 4 , the annuitized differentials are $8,778, $6,685 and $6,323 for federal, state, and local workers, respectively. The mean yearly number of hours worked for our pension wealth sample in 2006 is 2,256 for private sector workers, 2,192 for federal workers, 2,148 for state workers, and 2,156 for local workers. Therefore, the annuitized pension wealth differentials per hour come to $4.00, $3.11 and $2.93 for federal, state, and local workers, respectively. As a proportion of the hourly private-sector wage, these amount to 17.2 percent, 13.4 percent, and 12.6 percent for federal, state, and local workers, respectively.
Preliminary Conclusions
Summary. Taken together, this section's results suggest that once differences in worker characteristics are taken into account, there are no statistically significant differences in hourly wages between state and local workers and their private sector counterparts. There is, however, a substantial wage differential for federal workers, ceteris paribus, of about 28 percent. In addition, employees of all levels of government generally have substantially more pension wealth than their private sector counterparts. Toward a comprehensive measure of compensation differentials. One way to generate comprehensive compensation differentials would be to take the sum of our hourly equivalent pension wealth differentials and the wage differentials from the second column of Table 3 . (Note 24) However, doing so could be misleading; seeing why brings us to the next complication in interpreting the pension wealth differentials. Suppose that a given individual's DB pension is funded entirely by her own contributions; the employer puts in nothing. In that case, pension wealth would not represent any additional compensation; it would just be a use to which the individual puts her wages. Hence, it would be inappropriate to add the pension wealth and wage differentials to obtain a total compensation differential.
More generally, as long as a portion of contributions to DB pension plans comes from employees, then to some extent double-counting will occur if one simply adds the wage and pension differentials. This observation immediately leads to the question of how much pension wealth is due to employer and to employee contributions, respectively. Our data do not provide an answer. However, using information from several sources, a back-of-the-envelope estimate is possible. The steps in this calculation are as follows:
First, obtain an estimate of the average hourly amount of DC contributions made by employers and employees in each sector. As noted in Section 3, this information is available in the HRS data.
Second, obtain an estimate of the hourly amount of DB contributions made by employers and employees. The HRS data do not have this information. However, Bureau of Labor Statistics data allow us to make a rough imputation. Specifically, BLS data report the average hourly employer cost for state and local workers' DB plans ($2.27 in 2006) (Note 25) and the average required employee contribution rate for state and local workers' DB plans (6.3 percent in 2007) (Note 26). Given that the average required employee DB contribution rate is computed only over the set of state and local employees with DB plans requiring an employee contribution, we multiply the 6.3 percent figure by the percentage of DB plans that require a contribution (77 percent in 2007) (Note 27), which yields an average employee contribution rate of 4.85 percent across all workers. For federal workers, the website of the Office of Personnel Management indicates that the contribution rate is 7.0, 7.5 or 8.0 percent for both employers and employees; we use 7.5 percent, the midpoint of this range (Note 28). By multiplying the employee's average required DB contribution rate with the mean hourly wages listed in Table 1 and the average number of DB plans per worker in each sector in our sample, we calculate hourly employee DB contributions of $1.60 for federal workers, $1.55 for state workers, and $0.89 for local workers.
Third, multiply our respective estimated hourly pension wealth differentials by the ratio of the sum of the employer DC and DB contributions to the sum of employer and employee DC and DB contributions. This yields a set of differentials due to employer contributions. An appendix available upon request provides details.
The last step is to add these figures to the wage differentials from column (2) of Table 3 . Given that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the state and local differentials are zero, for this purpose we simply treat them as zero. This yields total compensation differentials of 34.2 percent for federal employees (Note 29), 7.49 percent for state employees, and 8.29 percent for local employees.
Alternative Specifications
In order to assess the robustness of our results, in this section we estimate several alternate specifications of the basic model.
Differential Effects by Education
In our model, sectoral compensation differentials are independent of education. This specification runs counter to longstanding concerns that because of inflexibilities in government pay schedules, highly educated public sector workers earn less than their private sector counterparts. (Note 30) We explore this hypothesis by augmenting our basic model with interaction terms between the sectoral dichotomous variables and a binary variable, CollegePlus, which equals one if a worker has a four-year college or higher degree, and zero otherwise. We report here only the key results. In the equation for WAGE + DC, the interactions of the sectoral dichotomous variables with CollegePlus are all statistically insignificant. For pension wealth, the interaction term between STATE and CollegePlus is positive and significant at $75,820 (s.e. = $27,906), while the other two sectoral interaction terms are insignificant. Thus, we find no evidence in our data that highly educated workers are disadvantaged by working in the public sector. Table 3 with a set of dichotomous variables for occupation. The number of observations differs from that of the basic sample (2,946) because not every respondent provided information about occupation. The other right-hand side variables are the same as in Table 3 , but not reported here. Standard errors are in parentheses. A (***) indicates that the variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, a (**) at the 5 percent level, and a (*) at the 10 percent level.
We chose not to include controls for occupation in our basic model because of concerns that it might be jointly determined with compensation. In addition, in our data, occupation is reported for only 1,453 observations, considerably fewer than the 2,496 used to generate the estimates in Table 3 . Nevertheless, it is of some interest to see if our results change qualitatively when we augment the model with a set of dichotomous variables designating occupational categories. (Note 31) Table 5 displays the results for the logarithm of (WAGE+DC). In columns (1) and (2) we establish a baseline by using the smaller sample to estimate the models from the last two columns of Table 3 , and then add the occupation variables in column (3). Only the coefficients on the sectoral variables are reported. The coefficients in columns (1) and (2), while having somewhat different magnitudes, are qualitatively similar to their counterparts in Table 3 . Once occupation controls are added in column (3), the implied federal differentials falls slightly and remains statistically significant. The point estimate, 0.265, is virtually the same as the corresponding figure in Table 3 , 0.277. The state and local differentials remain statistically insignificant, also just as they were in Table 3 . In short, our substantive results are essentially unchanged when controls for occupation are included. (Note 32)
Conclusion
We have used a sample of older full-time workers from the 2006 Health and Retirement Study to study wage and pension compensation differentials between government and private sector employees. With respect to hourly wages (including employee contributions to defined contribution plans), federal workers earn a premium of about 28 log points. However, no statistically significant differences for state and local workers emerge once employee characteristics are taken into account. Workers at all levels of government accumulate more pension wealth than private sector workers, even after holding employee characteristics constant. Specifically, as a proportion of the hourly private-sector wage, the hourly equivalent public-private differentials are about 17.2 percent, 13.4 percent and 12.6 percent at the federal, state, and local levels, respectively. Our results offer some support to both sides in the rather noisy public debate over public sector compensation. The argument that taking worker characteristics into account can make a big difference in public-private comparisons is correct. However, those who assert that examining wages alone can be misleading are also right. Once pension benefits are taken into account, employees at all levels of government receive higher compensation than private sector workers, and these differentials cannot be explained away by differences in worker characteristics.
As usual, one must be cautious in interpreting compensation differences. They might be due to compensating differentials associated with unobserved job characteristics, or they might arise from successful rent-seeking. An important subject for future research is to determine the source of these unexplained differences. Further, it would be interesting to apply the methods used in this paper to a sample that includes a larger proportion of younger workers, if a data set with all the requisite variables were to become available. Integrating information on the value of other benefits (such as employer-provided health insurance) with wage and pension differentials within a micro data framework is another important topic for future research.
